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 1 
AFTER OBERGELL: 
THE LIBERAL STATE INTEREST IN MARRIAGE 
Kari E. Hong∗ 
 
In June 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges unequivocally established that same-sex 
couples have a fundamental right to marry.1  During the forty-year debate over the merits 
of same-sex marriage, ideological rhetoric over the value of marriage was neatly divided.  
Conservative scholars lauded the institution of marriage and warned that its demise 
(whether through same-sex couples, divorce, or single-motherhood) would exact lasting 
damage on families and society.2  Many notable liberal scholars pivoted away from the 
sanctity of marriage, instead calling for support for the parent/child relationship.3   
 
Up until Obergefell, a traditional pro-marriage ideology was used in justifying 
homophobic laws and the entrenched sexism of traditional marriages.  Inside and outside 
of courthouses, those who opposed same-sex marriage often did so by citing to 
inflammatory and faulty studies that suggested the most notable injury to a child—
criminal activity for the boys, sexual promiscuity and adult-poverty for the girls, and a 
heightened risk of child molestation for both—arose exclusively from not having proper 
gendered parent figures in the home.4  The evidence upon which these assertions were 
made—and vigorously defended by state attorneys general in courtrooms—has now been 
debunked.5   
 
Although wrong with respect to their political agenda of valuing traditional 
marriage over other family structures, what if the defenders of traditional marriage in fact 
                                                 
∗Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. I wish to thank Rebecca Aviel, David Baluarte, Michal 
Buchhandler-Raphael, Kent Greenfield, Clare Huntington, Mary Holper, Dan Kanstroom, Sanford Katz, 
Daniel Lyons, Joseph Liu, Jim Repetti, Ray Madoff, Solangel Maldonado, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Zygmunt 
Plater, Mark Spiegel, Carol Sanger, Natalya Shnitser, Robin Fretwell Wilson for helpful conversations and 
comments.  I also wish to thank the Washington & Lee Law School, the AALS Family & Juvenile Law 
Section, and the Law, Religion, and The Family Unit After Hobby Lobby symposium at the University of 
Illinois Law School for opportunities to present earlier drafts of this paper.  I am grateful to Lauren Schaal 
who provided excellent research assistance.  I wish to give special thanks to Carol Sanger and Sanford Katz 
for suggesting the original idea for this piece. 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  
2 See generally George Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 
428–30 (2004); Maggie Gallagher, Keynote Address: The Case for the Future of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 185, 186 (2005); Lynn D. Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children's Right to Their 
Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011). 
3 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 244–45 (2001); 
Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008); Nancy D. Polikoff, 
For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 573 (2005). 
4 For an overview of the arguments raised and criticisms of the proffered evidence, see Kari E. Hong, 
Parens Patri(Archy): Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003). 
5 See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991–95, 997–1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (after a 
12-day trial with 19 witnesses, the federal district court made 80 findings of fact that concluded that no 
compelling state interest justified denying same-sex couples the right to marry) vacated on other grounds 
and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2013); see also 
Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2013). 
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were absolutely right in asserting that there is something of great value in the institution 
of marriage?   
 
Part I explores how, in the past 40 years, the state purpose in marriage was 
fundamentally redefined from a societal interest in procreation to an individual right to 
self-determination.  Prior to Griswold v. Connecticut’s privacy protections, the 50 states 
policed sex that occurred both inside and outside of marriages.6 
 
As the scaffolding of the criminalization of sex fell, the state interest in marriage 
was largely unarticulated until the 2003 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
decision.7  In the first case that affirmatively that extended protections to same-sex 
couples, the Massachusetts court no longer claimed that marriage was a hallowed 
institution that perpetuated civilization.  Nonetheless, it too claimed that the private event 
of falling in love aggregated into a larger public project.  Specifically, the intimate 
decision of choosing—or not choosing—a partnership with another became a critical act 
of self-realization and when chosen, an ability to share a common humanity with the 
larger population.   
 
Part II suggests that there is something different and unique that marriage offers 
to its participants.  Sex, procreation, and companionship have been defined as the legal 
essentials of marriage.  In an effort to articulate an intangible, transcendent value of 
marriage, I look at immigration and prisoner cases in which these marriage essentials of 
marriage are absent.  
Part III proposes a tangible state interest in contemporary marriage: a new 
relationship between the citizen and the Liberal state.  In a fascinating exchange between 
the Obergefell’s majority and Justice Robert’s dissent, Justice Roberts criticizes the 
majority for fashioning a privacy right that had been previously unknown.  Instead of a 
right to be let alone, Obergefell confers an affirmative protection to couples who were not 
harmed by any affirmative government intrusion, deprivation, or seizure.  Obergefell’s 
sword becomes a means by which individuals can newly obtain government benefits 
instead of being merely protected from government harm.  This essay ends with a call to 
rethink the concept of constitutional privacy and considers the immigration contexts as 
one by which government intrusions into personal affairs may provide more protections 
than a privacy right that leaves its citizens to fend for themselves.   
 
I. FROM PROCREATION TO LIBERTY: THE LEGAL PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE 
 
Much credit must be given to LGBT activists who have advocated for marriage 
equality.8  However, Obergefell should not be proof that Americans have fully embraced 
                                                 
6 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
7 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
8 See, e.g., Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became A Constitutional Right, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politics-
activism/397052/.  
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LGBT equality.9  Rather, the extension of marriage to same-sex couples arose from the 
fact that, over the past 40 years, most straight people had come to internalize a redefined 
purpose of marriage that was much more than procreation.    
 
A. Marriage Was The Exclusive Institution In Which Procreative Sex Was Permitted 
(And Supposed) To Occur. 
Although comical when said out loud today, procreation’s centrality to 
marriage—as it was understood fifty years ago—was correct as a descriptive legal 
statement.  In practice, procreation has never been confined to marriage.  There have 
been children born out of wedlock ever since there was wedlock.10  Today, in the United 
States, approximately 40 percent of births occur outside of marriage.11  However, up until 
the 1960s, the 50 states marshaled their police powers to confine legal sex to marriage 
and to ensure that any sex that occurred in a marriage was procreative.   
1. Sex Outside of Marriage Criminalized As Fornication, Adultery, and Rape 
Sex outside of marriage was criminalized, punished as the felony and 
misdemeanor crimes of fornication (sex between unmarried adults) and adultery (sex 
outside of marriage where one person was married to another).12  In these prosecutions, a 
person’s marital status was a critical element of the crime.  When relevant, defendants 
routinely would cite their own or their partner’s marital status as a defense to the charged 
crimes.13   
In contemporary rape law, marriage continues to delineate which sex acts are 
legal and which ones are not.  The crime of statutory rape (sex between an adult and a 
minor) persists as a status crime, not requiring mens rea.14  The fact that such an offense 
is a strict liability crime makes its only potential defense—marriage—an even more 
remarkable exception.15  The crime of rape between adults also remains defined by 
marriage.  Although the marital rape exception has been formally abolished, marriage 
                                                 
9 See generally Chris Isidore, How Businesses Can Still Discriminate Against LGBT People, CNN MONEY 
(Jun 26, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/26/news/companies/lgbt-discrimination/. 
10 See generally Elisabetta Povoledo, In Search for Killer, DNA Sweep Exposes Intimate Family Secrets in 
Italy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2014 (to find the killer of a child, “investigators embarked on the country’s 
largest DNA dragnet, taking genetic samples from nearly 22,000 people. . . . [T]he DNA testing also 
revealed something unknown even to the suspect’s family: that he was the illegitimate son of a man who 
had died in 1999.”). 
11 The most recent statistics from the CDC are that unmarried women account for 40.6% of all births in the 
United States. See Unmarried Childbearing, FASTSTATS, (last visited Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm. 
12 See generally Hopgood v. State, 76 Ga. App. 240, 241 (1947). 
13 Hopgood, 76 Ga. App. at 242. 
14 “A majority of states make statutory rape a strict liability offense with respect to the child’s age.  This 
principle results in some prosecutions in which the intercourse is undisputedly consensual and the child is 
nearly the age of consent, with the defendant reasonably believing her to be of lawful age.”  CRUMP, ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 356 (3d. ed. 2013). 
15 Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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reduces the seriousness of the offense and lengths of punishment.16  As evident in rape 
law, marriage still casts a long shadow in the definition of contemporary sex crimes. 
2. Criminalizing Cohabitation and Specific Types of Marriages .  
Illicit cohabitation—the crime of people of opposite sex living together—was also 
criminalized.  These statutes gained popularity after the Civil War as a means to harass 
interracial relationships and members of the Church of the Latter Day Saints.17  Despite 
their nefarious origins, by the 1960s the majority of states had enacted them and used 
them against all cohabitating couples.18  
Between 1800 and 1967, 40 states criminalized interracial marriages in some form 
or another.19  The state interest in banning these relationships revolved around 
procreation, and specifically preventing the birth of children from these unions.20  
3. Contraception and “Unnatural” Sex 
Marriage was never a license to engage in any type of sex.  Sodomy—even when 
consensual—was criminalized as unnatural sex.21  Although it was not illegal for married 
couples to use contraception, it was illegal for doctors—and others—to advise, counsel, 
and provide information and contraception to married couples.22   
                                                 
16 Since 1993, the marital rape exemption as a concept of immunity has been formally abolished in all 50 
states. See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A 
New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1521 (2003).  California for instance 
has separate statutes for rape of a non-spouse, section 261, and rape of a spouse, section 262. CAL PENAL 
CODE §§ 261, 262 (West 2013). Under section 262, the rape “of a person who is the spouse of the 
perpetrator” has differently-defined conduct that would result in rape. Id. at § 262. Moreover, section 262 
contemplates “probation, fines” for punishment whereas section 261 is punished with prison. Id. at §§ 261, 
262 
17 See generally Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1193 (D. Utah 2013) (striking down Utah’s 
cohabitation law as impermissibly vague); United States v. Higgerson, 46 F. 750, 751 (C.C.D. Idaho 1891); 
RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 70–91 
(Pantheon Books ed. 2003). In 1882, unlawful cohabitation became a crime in the United States with the 
enactment of the Edmunds Act. See Erin P. B. Zasada, Civil Rights-Rights Protected and Discrimination 
Prohibited: Living in Sin in North Dakota? Not Under My Lease North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. 
v. Peterson, 2001 Nd 81, 625 N.W.2d 551 (2001), 78 N.D. L. REV. 539, 541 (2002). 
18 Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J. L. & 
FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005).   
19 Every state whose black population exceeded 5% passed anti-miscegenation laws targeting black and 
white couples. See Leti Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Laws in California, 33 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795, 833–38 (2000). On the West Coast, states passed anti-miscegenation laws 
targeting the Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and Southeast Asian populations. See id.  
20 See State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (“It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of 
a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly 
have any progeny, and such a fact sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks 
and whites, laying out of view other sufficient grounds for such enactments.”). 
21 Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (introducing husband’s 
sodomy conviction as a means of receiving a divorce based on adultery in divorce proceeding). 
22 See, e.g., Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 58, 156 A.2d 508 (1959) (upholding alaw preventing use of 
contraception by married couples because “the greater good would be served by leaving the statutes as they 
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B. Early Marriage Equality Cases Mirrored The Legal Reality That The Primary 
Purpose of Marriage Was Procreation 
It is from this context that the pre-Obergefell lines of marriage cases must be 
analyzed.   
Baker v. Nelson was the first case in which two gay men challenged a state clerk’s 
decision not to issue them a marriage license.23  In 1971, there was no law in Minnesota 
expressly limiting marriage to members of the opposite sex.  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court nonetheless dismissed any statutory ambiguity on the grounds that it was 
“unrealistic” to think the drafters intended marriage to extend to people of the same sex.24  
The plaintiffs raised a second argument, raising a federal constitutional question, on 
which the Minnesota Supreme Court was equally dismissive.  In explaining how the right 
to marry was limited to heterosexual individuals, the state court observed—in the most 
cursory manner—that “[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, 
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the 
book of Genesis.”25  
I believe it is a mistake to write off Baker v. Nelson’s citation to procreation as 
outdated anti-gay discrimination. To the contrary, what is notable is that procreation was 
presented as such an obvious, central, and defining aspect of marriage that no further 
explanation (or citation outside of The Book of Genesis) was needed.26     
Baker v. Nelson’s unassailable assumption that marriage could only exist with the 
promise of procreation was not confined to heterosexuality.  To the contrary, Loving v. 
Virginia, which was decided four years earlier, reinforced the purpose of marriage to be 
procreation.27  In explaining the value of marriage, the Supreme Court noted that 
marriage was “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”28  This phrase was not 
intended to be hyperbole.  Rather, the Supreme Court supports “our very existence,” with 
a citation to Skinner v. Oklahoma, the case ended the State’s ability to sterilize its 
citizens.29  Procreation becomes an essential element of marriage, as marriage is the 
exclusive means by which the species propagates itself.  The unassailable axiom is that 
marriage exists for producing children, and without marriage, no more children would be 
born.  
                                                                                                                                                 
are.”). But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (overturning such laws because “[t]he present case, then, 
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees.”). 
23 Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311 (1971), appeal dismissed “for want of a substantial federal 
question” in Baker v. Nelson, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972). 
24 Baker, 291 Minn. at 311. 
25 Id. at 312. 
26 The irony, of course, is that Genesis is not the place to find models of happy monogamous heterosexual 
pairings. Rather, God found favor with the fathers of the Judeo-Christian religion—Abraham, David, 
Jacob—and those religious figures were in adulterous, bigamous, and polygamous relationships. Genesis 
16:1–16, 29; 1 Chronicles 3. 
27 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 
29 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942). 
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Viewed from our contemporary eyes, this centrality of procreation to marriage 
seems confusing and anachronistic.  But in 1967 (the date of Loving) and 1971 (the date 
of Baker), society was continuing to police, and still criminalize, sex outside of marriage.  
In this context, procreation as a—if not the—defining state interest in marriage was quite 
rational and reasoned. 
C. From Goodridge to Windsor: Rethinking The Primary Purpose of Marriage  
In the history of social change, it is easy for legal scholars to be reductive in our 
thinking, to trace shifts from one Supreme Court decision to another.  What is lost in this 
method is that progress usually is not usually made in full steady strides.  To the contrary, 
state courts show the fits and starts that occur as society grapples with the collateral 
issues that legal equality ushers in.30   
Obergefell will most certainly be published in casebooks documenting marriage 
equality for lesbian and gay individuals.31  However, the Obergefell decision was not the 
first decision to recognize the social zeitgeist regarding how marriage changed.  Rather, it 
was the 2003 decision, Goodridge v. Massachusetts, a decision from a decade earlier, that 
did so.   
In 2003, Goodridge made history as the first state court that fully and forcefully 
extended marriage to same-sex couples.32  Unique to Goodridge, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court did not ask the question of whether gay and lesbian couples could 
be excluded from marriage.33  In so doing, the decision avoided the pitfalls of prior 
decisions that noted the historical absence of these relationships or were mired in the 
contemporary moral opprobrium against gay people.34  
 
                                                 
30 By way of example, Loving v. Virginia is usually called up as the case that ended the country’s ban on 
anti-miscegenation laws. But 19 years earlier—in 1948—the California Supreme Court was the first to 
strike down an anti-miscegenation law—six years before the Supreme Court ended segregation as a 
violation of equal protection in Brown v. Board of Education. See Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 729. For an excellent 
discussion on how Perez had a more robust discussion of the harms of anti-miscegenation laws than what is 
found in Loving, see R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the 
Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844–45 (2008). 
31 See HARRIS & CARBONE, FAMILY LAW (2015) (updating Family Law book with Obergefell citation in 
August 2015). 
32 In 1993, Hawaii became the first state to have its judiciary suggest that the denial of marriage to same-
sex couples might be an equal protection problem.  Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 559, 852 P.2d 44, 58 
(1993). In 1998, Hawaii’s voters undid the judicial ruling by amending their constitution to bar such 
unions.  In 1999, Vermont became the first state to expressly declare that the denial of marriage to same-
sex couples violated Vermont’s “Common Benefits Clause,” a state provision that operated as a more 
robust form of the federal equal protection clause. See Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 202 (1999). However, 
this court decision too was diluted by the legislature that refused to extend marriage to same-sex couples. 
See Liz Halloran, How Vermont’s “Civil” War Fueled the Gay Marriage Movement, NPR, Mar. 23, 2013, 
http://www.npr.org/2013/03/27/174651233/how-vermonts-civil-war-fueled-the-gay-marriage-movement. 
33 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 320. 
34 Andersen v. King Cnty., 158 Wash.2d 1, 44, 138 P.3d 963, 986 (2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 
338, 362, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (2006); Baehr, 74 Haw. at 553, as clarified on reconsideration.  
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Instead, Goodridge’s starting point instead was “[s]imply put, the government 
creates civil marriage.”35  Goodridge’s deft turn reframed the question from a plaintiff 
same sex couple asking for an exception to the longstanding history of civilization, to 
rather, examining what was the purpose of marriage for all of us.  In answering this 
question, Goodridge made three notable contributions to the framing of the marriage 
debate.  
First, Goodridge enumerated the hundreds of private and social advantages that 
the State conferred on those who married.36  Marriage was taken outside of the moral and 
religious debates of the day.37  Goodridge squarely defended marriage as a public 
institution that was properly defined by state government.    
Second, Goodridge redefined the personal commitment to marriage to be “the 
decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-
definition.”38  Instead of the linchpin that perpetuates the human race, the act of falling in 
love with another was seemingly much more pedestrian:  a choice that some people 
made, and others did not.  
Third, Goodridge reimagined how the institution of marriage contributed to 
society.  “Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that 
express our common humanity. . . .” 39  Of note, a person’s most intimate act of falling in 
love continued to aggregate into a larger public purpose.  The personal decision to marry 
became a means to stake out an identity.  The public impact of such a decision permitted 
one’s identity to be a shared currency that was recognized and accepted by many.  
The state interest in marriage was no longer was an exclusively heterosexual 
function of procreation or perpetuating the species.  Instead, the right to marry became 
fundamental because it permitted someone to partake in the full range of human 
experience.  Those who choose to marry share a means of publicly expressing their 
inclusion in a shared attribute of dignity and membership in the larger community.40  For 
gay men and lesbians, they were no longer excluded from the biological function of 
procreation.  To the contrary, a gay man’s or lesbian’s act of falling in love with another 
became a recognized trait, extending an invitation to the previously-exiled into an invited, 
included community.41 
                                                 
35 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 321. 
36 Id. at 322. 
37 In 2003, no mainstream religious organizations supported same-sex marriage. Robert P. Jones, Religious 
Americans Support Gay Marriage, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/religious-americans-support-gay-marriage/391646/. 
38 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 322. 
39 Id. 
40 For criticisms of the elevation of marriage to serve this purpose, see Michael Cobb, The Supreme Court’s 
Lonely Hearts Club, NY TIMES, June 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-
courts-lonely-hearts-club.html. 
41 In 2003, Goodridge’s redefinition of the marriage debate was not at all embraced. To the contrary, from 
2004 to 2012, 41 states raced to amend—and successfully amended—state laws and constitutions to 
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In today’s world, outside of the legal arena, procreation no longer resonates as the 
primary purpose of marriage.  Sex outside of marriage has been decriminalized.42  Young 
people no longer save themselves for marriages.43  (Indeed for those that do, they are the 
curiosity of reality shows.)44   
 
Gay people thus were not granted marriage rights neither because of a shift in 
gender roles in heterosexual marriages nor as an embrace of a larger LGBT equality 
movement.  Rather, straight people no longer required procreation to bring value to a 
marital relationship.45  It is precisely this shift in the societal understanding of marriage 
that allowed marriage to be logically—and legally—extended to same-sex couples in a 
seamless manner.  
 
II. SEARCHING FOR A TRANSCENDENT STATE INTEREST IN MARRIAGE 
 
A. What If In Fact There Is Something Special About Marriage? 
 
As mentioned above, the forty-year debate over the merits of same-sex marriage 
was marked with an ideological divide.  Conservative scholars lauded the institution of 
marriage and many liberal scholars were skeptical of the emphasis on and importance of 
the institution.46   
 
Now divorced from the nefarious ends of divesting rights from lesbian and gay 
citizens, new conversations have begun regarding what may be the value in marriage.  
Specifically, there are two notable ways by which marriage is different from other 
relationships.   
 
First, there is a post-modern, formalist function to marriage.  When the state of 
California gave every single of the estimated 1,400 legal rights and benefits to same-sex 
couples that it gave to opposite-sex couples, the omission of one single word—the title of 
marriage—mattered.  The Ninth Circuit observed that a constitutional right may even 
attach to “the extraordinary significance of the official designation of ‘marriage.’”47  
Writing for the majority, Judge Reinhardt observed that “[a] rose by any other name may 
                                                                                                                                                 
prevent their courts from following Massachusetts. See Tim Grieve, Bush’s War Over Gay Marriage, 
SALON, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.salon.com/2004/02/26/gay_marriage_15/..  
42 See supra notes 14–37 and accompanying text. 
43 John Blake, Why Young Christians Aren’t Waiting Anymore, CNN (Sept. 27, 2011). 
44 See 19 Kids and Counting, a recently cancelled reality show focused on a conservative Christian family 
that did not use birth control and did not permit their children to engage in sexual activity before marriage. 
45 Nicholas DiDomizio, 11 Brutally Honest Reasons Why Millennials Don’t Want Kids, 
CONNECTIONS.MIC, July 30, 2015. In Gallup polls, those who found it “morally acceptable” for unmarried 
men and women to have sex increased from 53% in 2001 to 68% in 2015.  Those who found it “morally 
acceptable” to give birth outside of marriage also rose from 42% in 2001 to 61% in 2015. Gallup Poll, 
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx. 
46 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. But see MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS (Marsha Garrison 
& Elizabeth Scott eds., Cambridge 2012) (collection of essays discussing aspects of policy that promotes 
marriage and non-marital families). 
47 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 186 L. Ed.2d 768 (2013). 
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smell as sweet, but to the couple desiring to enter into a committed lifelong relationship, 
a marriage by the name of ‘registered domestic partnership’ does not.”48  There is 
growing scholarship that contends that the act of marriage itself, the formalization of a 
private relationship into something larger does indeed create something larger that cannot 
be replicated in other relationships.49  
 
Second, others have started to excavate and name the intangible benefits that may 
arise from marriage.50  That said, an inquiry into the intangible benefits will be a tangled 
one at best.  We have a century-worth of cases recognizing various values that marriage 
has had in the lives of its citizens.  Traditionally, those benefits have been conferred to 
only one party, most specifically husbands rather than wives.51  Nonetheless there have 
been notable moments when courts have started to recognize some transcendent values in 
marriage that do provide benefits that are arguably desirable in contemporary times.   
 
To contribute to what may be an intangible benefit uniquely arising from 
marriage, in the next section, I wish to look at three cases where the traditional essentials 
of marriage—sex, procreation, and companionship—are not just absent, but impossible.   
 
B. Seeking A Transcendent, Intangible Benefit in Marriage 
In 2002, in Gerber v. Hickman, a prisoner brought a section 1983 claim, asking 
the warden to give him permission to send through the mail a vial of sperm to his wife so 
that his she may attempt procreation with medical assistance.52  The en banc court upheld 
the warden’s denial, but a vociferous dissent by Judge Alex Kozinski took to task the 
holding that “the right to procreate is inconsistent with incarceration.”53  In engaging in 
the legal issues in the case, Judge Kozinski cited to state regulations that do permit 
prisoners to potentially procreate when conjugal relationships are granted.  His fiery 
dissent, however, is more powerful as a means to question what can a marriage provide to 
parties when they cannot procreate and—with the permanent separation of a term of life 
imprisonment—cannot share lives in the way that those living together do?  
In 1964, in Matter of Peterson, a 56-year-old citizen met a 49-year-old woman 
who was a citizen of Iran.54  The husband was a widower, and the wife had an adult 
daughter from her first marriage.  They first met when the woman (later wife) answered 
an ad placed by the man (later husband) looking for a housekeeper with marriage as a 
potential result.  When the citizen applied for his wife’s green card, the immigration 
agency initially deemed the application fraudulent, citing as proof the couple’s initial 
                                                 
48 Id.  
49 See generally Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2009–
10 (2014) (discussing the transformative effects of formalizing relationships such as marriage). 
50 See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL 
KINDS OF FAMILIES (Beacon Press 2015). 
51 See generally Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 651 (1993). 
52 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617,619 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
53 In employing humor in a way that only Judge Kozinski can, he criticizes the penological interests in the 
five steps that would be involved in the prisoner’s request. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 629 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
54 Matter of Peterson, 12 I. & N. Dec. 663, 664 (BIA 1968). 
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meeting, and their admissions that they sleep in separate bedrooms and have not, and will 
not, engage in sexual intercourse.  On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—
an agency known for restrictive, if not draconian, interpretations of immigration law—
reversed.  The BIA did not quite explain how and why, but noted with sympathy that the 
husband was a widower in genuine need of a housekeeper.  In a conclusory manner, the 
BIA found that “[t]he reasons for the marriage appear to be far sounder than exist for 
most marriages.”55 
The most obvious shared insight from the Gerber and Peterson cases is that 
companionship is an aspect to marriage that the State recognizes and values.  The State’s 
protection of marriage benefits its own citizens and society at large (cynically, it serves as 
private welfare, more optimistically, the means by which the State may have a role in 
giving the pursuit of happiness to its citizenry).   
But the third case, Freeman v. Gonzales, prevents companionship from being the 
only available answer to the question as to why there is a State interest in contemporary 
marriage.56  Under our immigration laws, U.S. citizens are allowed to bring their spouses 
to the country and give them lawful permanent residence.57  This is more than settled 
practice and policy; it is the a defining hallmark of our immigration system.58   
In 1997, Congress wrote a confusing provision regulating what happens when a 
citizen spouse dies during the petition process.  A circuit split arose, and Freeman was 
one of the courts that defended the statutory interpretation that even when a citizen dies, 
his widow can enter and live in the US.  “Under the express terms of the statute, Mrs. 
Freeman qualified as the spouse of a U.S. citizen when she and her husband petitioned 
for adjustment of status, and absent a clear statutory provision voiding her spousal status 
upon her husband's untimely death, she remains a surviving spouse.”59  In 2009, President 
Obama signed a law, firmly establishing that the Freeman rule will be uniformly applied.  
As a result, when a citizen dies, his or her widow—a foreigner who is a citizen from 
another country—can now enter and live in the US, a coveted privilege conferred only to 
the spouses, children, and parents of citizens.  This change in immigration law is 
profound by recognizing that the benefits of marriage do not extinguish even in death. 
These three cases survey instances when sex, procreation, companionship—and 
even a spouse—are not just missing, but completely impossible in the marital 
relationship.  These cases are significant, because usually, when these essentials are 
absent, the State will not recognize a formal relationship.  Most states expressly define 
consummation as an essential statutory element of the marriage.60  For most everyone but 
the Petersons, the federal government will require consummation as proof that a marriage 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 See Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006). 
57 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
58 Two-thirds of lawful immigration occurs through family relationships with citizens or other lawful 
permanent residents.  INA § 203, Jacquellena Carrero, The Immigration Line: Who’s on It and For How 
Long, NBCLatino, Apr. 11, 2013. 
59 Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039-40. 
60 See generally Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-1 (West); See e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 188 Ga. App. 821 (1988)  
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is not fraudulent when conferring immigration benefits.61  The vast majority of states 
require both people to be present and alive for a marriage to be recognized.62 
 Peterson, Gerber, Freeman defied these general rules.  It is interesting that the 
courts defended the marital relationship—and their exceptions to the general rule—
without being able to name what it is precisely about the relationships that compel such 
sympathy.  Whether it be a platonic companionship, a security, an ideal, or even 
posthumous identity and caretaking function, marriage is providing important benefits we 
have yet to easily articulate.  Nonetheless, as much as these cases do not conclusively 
name what it is, they signal a trailhead, a path that is worthy to undertake to identify and 
articulate what that intangible aspect of marriage is.  Regardless, these cases suggest 
something intangible, something of value exists in marriage.  In this respect, Goodridge 
appears correct.  Perhaps whatever it is that makes us cry at weddings, these three 
marriages are examples whereby another’s marriage reminds us all of our common 
humanity.   
III. The Counterintuitive Liberal State Interest In Contemporary Marriage 
 
As much as articulating an intangible state interest in marriage is a difficult—yet 
important—journey, contemporary marriage does offer an important opportunity for 
citizens to redefine their relationship to the Liberal state.  
 
Parens patraie—the doctrine that the State has a role to protect those who cannot 
otherwise fend for themselves—is a means by which the modern State exercises its 
authority to protect the vulnerable, most often children and the mentally incompetent.63 
When the State intervenes for the purpose of protecting the vulnerable, the vast majority 
of Americans do see State involvement as a normative good.64  
 
Asking the State to lend additional support married couples, those with the most 
resources and protections, is a counterintuitive, if not morally questionable project. In 
today’s society, it is the unmarried people, especially those with children, who face the 
vulnerabilities that arise from a lack of legal protections and economic insecurity.  A 
number of scholars have noted disadvantages, and at times harms, that the institution of 
                                                 
61 Congress and the BIA have statutes and case law stating that consummation is not required to prove the 
existence of a valid marriage. See Matter of M, 7 I & N. Dec 601 (BIA 1957).  Nonetheless, in immigration 
proceedings, citizens and non-citizens are often required to answer questions about their sex lives.  See Adi 
v. United States, 498 F.Appx. 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2012). Individual immigration officers will find a marriage 
invalid in the absence of convincing evidence as to why there is consummation. See Nina Bernstein, Do 
You Take This Immigrant? N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010 at MB1. 
62 See generally Andrea B. Carroll, Reviving Proxy Marriage, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 457 (2011) (noting 
that only 5 states recognize proxy marriages,  and nearly all in an exceptionally narrow context involving 
military personnel.”). 
63 Parens patrie empowers the state to confer “protection for those unable to care for themselves.” BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see also Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English Child Custody Law, 
1600-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1344, 1346–47 
(1999)). 
64 See generally Michael Levenson, Baker Says State Will Review DCF Handling of Auburn Child, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2015 ).   
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marriage can perpetuate.  Martha Fineman and Clare Huntington have been among the 
most persuasive voices, calling for reforms to support for non-marital family units.65.  
 
Although I am in full agreement with the need for responding to those outside of 
marriage, I seek to make a case for the State intervention and support of those who do opt 
for marriage.   
 
A. Privacy As The Fundamental Right To Be Let Alone 
 
As a preliminary matter, I wish to first revisit the assumption that it is the right to 
be let alone that provides essential protections to our selves and democracy.  It is an 
understatement to contend that privacy is a valued commodity.  As Justice Brandeis 
articulated 100 years ago, the Founders “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.”66   
From a citizen’s right to control his home and destiny, American life has been 
imbued with a sense that an individual’s right to privacy is a precondition to achieving 
essential freedoms and liberties.67  The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments reinforce the idea that the right to be let alone—and left alone—from the 
State remains a vital, contemporary protection we receive from our democratic 
institutions.  
In family law, privacy also has been embraced as an expansive, dynamic doctrine, 
preventing the State from intruding upon familial decisions relating to procreation, 
abortion, child rearing, education, and family formation.68    
Family scholars have robustly critiqued the conditional nature of these 
protections.  Functional—and presumed functioning—families are let alone by the state.  
A family that possesses either a Man or Money (preferably both) may raise its children 
with as much confusion and chaos as it pleases as privacy shields inquiries and intrusion 
by the State.  By contrast, what Martha Fineman has called “public families”—families 
that are marked as inadequate or inferior—are subject to State “regulation, supervision, 
                                                 
65See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIP 
(Oxford 2014); see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (Routledge 1995).  
66Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from a 
decision upholding the government’s collection of evidence by wiretapping, Justice Brandeis wrote a 
forceful opinion arguing that for a citizen’s right be let alone is a fundamental value in our democracy);  
 see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) 
(articulating the “right to be left alone” in tort contexts). 
67 See ALEXANDER DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, VOLUME I 244–47 (1825). 
68 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (family formation); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 484 (1977) 
(same); Griswold, 381 U.S. (procreation). 
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and control.”69  The disruption of divorce, poverty, and abuse invites—and compels—the 
State to intervene. 70    
Underlying these criticisms is the unspoken assumption has been that a family’s 
right to be let alone is ultimately a desired station to which all families normatively 
should belong.  
But what if it is not the State intervention that is in fact the problem?  What if it is 
rather the underlying biases that sort out some families for regulation—rather than a 
family’s public status—that is the root of the matter?  Stated another way, what if the 
problem of regulating, policing, and punishing public families arises from the biases 
seeking conformity to a normative ideals but not the vehicle of State intervention, 
standing by itself? 
B. Obergefell’s Sword: Rethinking State Harm As Arising From No State 
Intervention  
Much has been written about the trifecta of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, but the 
right to privacy has taken on new qualities in the marriage equality movement. 
Beginning in Lawrence v. Texas, it was the right to be let alone that paved the 
way for Obergefell’s recognition of same-sex marriage.  Lawrence begins with the 
precise pronouncement that “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home.”71  It is this predicate formulation of privacy that leads to the 
abolishment of state laws criminalizing what is otherwise consensual, intimacy between 
adults.   
Twelve years later, when establishing that marriage is a fundamental right that 
must be conferred to same-sex couples, Obergefell cited to Lawrence a dozen times to 
support its reasoning and result.72   
But of import, Obergefell articulated a new intrusion of the State, which is not 
regulation or punishment of private choices.   Rather, the harm inflicted on those from 
whom marriage is withheld is “the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that 
soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”73  Privacy no 
longer is a carved out realm, a space apart from the State’s views in which individuals 
may order their lives in peace.  Rather, Justice Kennedy articulates a privacy right that 
demands that the State remove itself from public expressions that inflicts humiliation and 
stigmatization onto others.  In so doing, the State then must arbitrate values and 
                                                 
69 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, supra note 80, at 177–78. 
70 See generally Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a civil right challenge to a 
state’s records of suspect child abusers on the basis that the plaintiff parents “have not demonstrated a 
violation of any federal constitutional or statutory right of familial privacy.”); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy 
Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 113, 118–19 (2011). 
71 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
72 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
73 Id. 
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affirmatively protect those who are vulnerable to non-legal and intangible injuries.  The 
State suddenly becomes a guarantor of affirmative benefits. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts strongly objects to Obergefell’s new 
definition of privacy.  In objecting to the conclusion that recognition of same-sex 
marriage is required by the constitution, he observes that “[n]either Lawrence nor any 
other precedent in the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitioners assert 
here.”74  Justice Roberts notes that [u]nlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and 
sodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no government intrusion.  They create 
no crime and impose no punishment.  Same-sex couples remain free to live together, to 
engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit.  No one is 
‘condemned to live in loneliness’ by the laws challenged in these cases—no one.”75 
Justice Roberts affirms that “the laws [limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples] in no 
way interfere with the ‘right to be let alone.’”76  To again emphasize the perceived break 
that Obergefell makes from prior precedent, “petitioners do not seek privacy.  Quite the 
opposite, they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding 
government benefits.  Our cases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the 
shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements 
from the State.”77  
Obergefell is important because for the first time, the privacy doctrine is no longer 
a means to let people alone.  The harm imposed on same-sex couples by the State is not 
the harm envisioned by Justice Brandeis.  It was not an unwanted intervention in the 
sacred realm that caused injury, but rather, the State’s lack of intervention that inflicted 
the harm on the couple.  Under the guise of privacy, State intervention then becomes a 
powerful tool to obtain needed benefits and protections.   
C.  Extending Obergefell’s Sword To Other Contexts 
Predicated on the Obergefell’s proactive privacy right, I explore then how State 
invention in marriage can be a means to create more public families and more families 
subject to State intervention.   
It seems counterintuitive to want this.  Why would anyone want to invite the State 
into their personal affairs, casting judgments on what they should or should be doing?  
But the reality is that many private families, individuals who are fully functioning, are in 
need of the benefits of State intervention that are currently only provided to public 
families, those who are subject to government policing and supervision.  To provide two 
concrete examples, immigration and polygamy illustrate how State intervention is the 
only means to protect the harm facing married couples. 
                                                 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
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In a case decided 11 days before Obergefell, the debate between the constitutional 
protections afforded to a citizen married to a foreigner illustrate how Obergell’s sword is 
the only means to remedy specific harms in the immigration context.  
In Kerry v. Din, Mrs. Din, a U.S. citizen, petitioned for her husband to join her in 
the United States.78  The consular officer denied the husband’s request for an entry visa, 
citing only the inadmissibility ground relating to terrorism.  No further reason was given, 
and under the immigration rules, no review of a consular decision is permitted.  The non-
reviewability of an action by a consular officer is a very problematic policy.  News 
reports, and criminal dockets for that matter, contain brazen examples of corrupt consular 
officers, profiting handsomely without the benefit of immediate oversight.79   
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia mocked the dissent’s call for a 
constitutional recognition for Mrs. Din to live with her spouse in the United States.  
“Nothing in the cases Din cites establishes a free-floating and categorical liberty interest 
in marriage (or any other formulation Din offers) sufficient to trigger constitutional 
protection whenever a regulation in any way touches upon an aspect of the marital 
relationship.”80  Indeed, Din focused on the fact that a request to know the reasons as to 
why the federal government will not let a spouse enter the country is not akin to the 
State’s exercise of authority in the form of “dispossess[ion] of property, [being] thrown in 
jail, or even executed.”81  
But Mrs. Din was seeking more than simply a right to live with her husband 
anywhere in the world.  Mrs. Din was seeking the right to know the basis for a decision 
and an opportunity to correct a factual or legal mistake if one so existed.  Most often 
embedded as procedural due process rights, the respect afforded individuals who are 
treated with fairness is significant.  For those whose lives are fundamentally altered by 
government decisions, being left in the dark—with the confusion and doubts over the 
process—is often much more painful than the closure that comes from a final decision.   
Here, the Din family received no protection from being let alone.  To the contrary, 
the removal of the State powers from reviewing the consular decision is the precise harm 
the Dins were seeking to remedy.  As it stands, an immigration petition is a lesser right 
afforded to an alien, a realm of foreign policy over which Congress is given great 
deference.82  By contrast, Mrs. Din could have very much used Obergefell’s sword to 
ensure that her marriage—and the attendant right to choose to marry a specific person—
received the affirmative rights of notice and fair process from the federal government.  
Obergefell thus offers the possibility that a citizen’s marriage is a legal status to which 
                                                 
78 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132, 192 L. Ed. 2d 183 (2015). 
79 Calvin Godfrey, U.S. Consulate Officers Gone Wild, VICE, Sept. 4, 2013, at 1, 
http://www.vice.com/read/the-corrupt-secrets-of-the-american-consulate (reporting on the arrest of a 
consular officer who netted $10 million in a fraudulent visa scheme). 
80 Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2135. 
81 Id. at 2133. 
82 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (commenting on Congress’s plenary powers to shape 
immigration law); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimigation Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, AM. 
U. LAW. R. 367, 392–93 (2006). 
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heightened protections will attach.  Absent such legal status, oversight, rather than any 
intrusion, is what causes Mrs. Din’s marriage to diminish in stature and operation.  
CONCLUSION 
 This essay has been an attempt to ask more questions than it answers. Starting 
with the premise that marriage can provide unique and desirable value is the beginning of 
articulating what precisely such value may be.  The answer to that question most likely 
includes recognition that the old privacy doctrine, the right to be let alone, may have run 
its course.  At a minimum, there are specific contexts in which the involvement of the 
State in personal affairs is precisely the needed salve for an otherwise irreparable and 
irremediable injury.  The lasting impact of Obergefell may not at all be limited to the 
recognition of same-sex marriage.  To the contrary, if Justice Roberts’ dissent is correct, 
Obergefell’s sword may be the precise remedy for which many citizens who are 
vulnerable to the harms—arising from the lack of state intervention—have been waiting. 
 
